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RECENT CASE NOTES
relation between the order of the regents and the policy to be subserved
failed to occasion the court's consideration of this problem in this particular
exercise of the police power. We don't presume to suggest that had the
appellants included this problem in their contentions the result would have
been different in the instant case, more especially in view of the presumption
in favor of reasonableness. 29 However, we do submit that the decision of
the court is entirely sound on the facts so far as they relate to police power,
and the "fluttering of the dovecotes," referred to above, and vain mutterings
against the Supreme Court and the Constitution by agitators and reformers
grow largely out of an ignorance of the issues here before the court.
Compulsory military training in the first two years of the college cur-
riculum so far as it relates to a reasonable means of accomplishing a socially
desirable result is at least vulnerable.30 Besides the opposition to it which
has come from conscientious objectors there is that which comes from stu-
dents and their instructors who regard it as a waste of time and an incon-
gruity in an institution devoted to the peaceful arts. They argue that only
a minor fraction of ROTC cadets joins the Organized Reserve after gradua-
tion and that a still smaller fraction remains in it; that the training is wholly
inadequate to the making of fighters for modern warfare, and that mean-
while it cuts into the pursuit of other subjects and activities of much greater
consequence.31 It may well be that such views are not without foundation,
and that, if military matters were not so completely surrounded with an air
of mystery and the notion encouraged by those in charge that they are too
deep to be understood by the civilian mind,32 compulsory military training
in colleges would definitely appear to be clearly unreasonable in the sense that
it has no reasonable relation to the policy to be subserved. However, these
are matters that must be left to public opinion for correction, if correction is
needed. In the instant case the court, as we have said, was not given the
opportunity on the issues to consider the expediency of the ROTC plan.
C. Z. B.
Divorce-Effect of Decree Prohibiting Remarriage. Plaintiff brought
suit in equity in the District of Columbia alleging that she was the widow of
Daniel Loughran, Jr., deceased, whose estate was beneficiary of the trust in
question. Plaintiff originally had been married to Henry Daye in the District
of Columbia but had there been divorced by him in 1924 on the grounds of
adultery, and under the Code of the District was prohibited from remarrying.
Plaintiff, however, married Loughran in Florida in 1926, after both parties
had lived there for over two years, but later, in 1929, obtained a divorce
from him a mensa et thoro in Virginia. She sought to enforce in the District
of Columbia, as Loughran's widow, certain rights in the nature of dower and
to recover unpaid alimony. Held, that a statute of the domicile forbidding
remarriage of a spouse has only territorial effect and does not invalidate a
marriage solemnized in another State in conformity with the laws thereof,
29 This presumption extends to both reasonableness of purpose and the reasonable
character of the relation between the statute or ordinance and the policy to be subserved.
See Terrace v. Thompson (1923), 263 U. S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15; Mack v. Westbrook
(1919), 148 Ga. 690, 98 S. E. 339; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist (1920), 128
Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141; Ex Parte Farb (1918), 178 Cal. 592, 174 P. 320; Union Fisher-
men's Co-Operative Packing Co. v. Shoemaker (1921), 98 Or. 659, 194 P. 854; Lawton
v. Steele (1894), 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499.
30 Literary Digest, Dec. 15, 1934, at 7.
31 Ibid.
32 Chicago Tribune (editorial), Weds., Jan. 2, 1935.
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thereby affording no obstacle to plaintiff's assertion in the courts of the
District of rights to dower arising from her subsequent marriage.1
As a general rule, marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise
declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where entered
into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.2 Statutes, however,
sometimes impose restrictions upon marriage in some cases. Such a statute
prohibiting or restricting marriage of divorced persons is very common and
takes a variety of forms. The statute may forbid the marriage of both
parties within a stated time from rendition of the decree, may impose a
prohibition upon the guilty party only, or may leave it to the court to impose
or remove such restrictions. 3 A restriction of some sort exists in about
three-fourths of the American states and territories; but few, if any, states
now prohibit remarriage of divorced spouses between themselves.4
As in the instant case, the question often arises whether such a restriction
in the state where the divorce was rendered has any extraterritorial effect
upon marriage subsequently entered into by the prohibited party in another
state, so as to prevent recognition of the marriage by the state imposing the
restriction. The general weight of authority, in accord with the principal
case, probably is that such a subsequent remarriage, if valid in the state where
entered into, is valid everywhere, even in the state where the divorce was
granted.5 This rule, however, is applicable where the statute imposing the
restriction prohibits only marriages within the state. It is the law of the
domicile at the time of the remarriage of the prohibited party, however,
which determines the validity of the remarriage;7 and cases which have
declared the foreign marriage invalid, seemingly contra to the above rule,
actually all involved the recognition of the foreign marriage at the domicile
of the restricted party.8 If the statute prohibits remarriage after divorce
either within or without the state, and a person remaining domiciled in that
state remarries elsewhere, such marriage is invalid everywhere. 9 But when
a person so forbidden to remarry by such a statute changes his domicile, the
statute will no longer, be applicable to his remarriage, and the marriage is
valid everywhere. 10
Statutes prohibiting remarriage have been criticized as against sound
public policy, as generally ineffectual, and as conducive to litigation and un-
certainty.1 It would seem that these objections are well taken. The present
1 Loughran v. Loughran (1934), 292 U. S. 216.
2 Meister v. Moore (1877), 96 U. S. 76; Travers v. Reinhardt (1907), 205 U. S.
423; Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), secs. 121, 132; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(1927, 1st ed.), sec. 113, p. 252.
3 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927, 1st ed.), sec. 114, p. 259.
4 Weidlich, Rationale of Restraint Upon Remarriage After Divorce (1933), 19 Am.
Bar Assoc. J. 529.
5 In re Wood's Estate (1902), 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. 900; Dudley v. Dudley (1911),
151 Iowa 142, 1-30 N. W. 785; Commonwealth v. Lane (1873), 113 Mass. 458; Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall (1881), 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505; Restatement of Conflict of
Laws (1934), sec. 131; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927, 1st ed.), sec. 114, p. 260.
6 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), sec. 131.
7 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), sec. 131b; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(1927, 1st ed.), sec. 114, p. 262.
8 Wilson v. Cook (1912), 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222; Succession of Gabisso (1907),
119 La. 704, 44 So. 438; In re Stull's Estate (1898), 183 Pa. 625, 39 At. 16; Pennegar
V. State (1889), 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S. W. 305; Knoll v. Knoll (1918), 104 Wash. 110,
176 Pac 22; Lanham v. lanham (1908), 136 Wis. 306, 117 N. W. 787; Goodrich, Con-
flict of Laws (1927, 1st ed.), sec. 114, p. 260.
9 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), sec. 131.
10 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), sec. 131.
11 Weidlich, Rationale of Restraint Upon Remarriage After Divorce (1933), 19
Am. Bar Assoc. J. 529.
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Indiana statute is unique, inasmuch as it prohibits for two years after decree
the remarriage of the successful plaintiff where divorce has been obtained
through notice by publication. 12 The purpose of this statute is to allow a
decree obtained by such substituted service to be reopened by the absent
defendant, and represents good sense, in spite of comments 13 to the contrary.
R. S. O.
Negligence-As a Matter of Law or a Question of Fact-Contributory
Negligence of Customers. Appellant sued appellee to recover damages for
injuries alleged to have been sustained as a result of falling over weighing
scales negligently placed in the aisle near the entrance of appellee's store.
Appellant alleged that on December 23, 1930 she was trading in said store;
that appellee had placed the said scales near the entrance of said store in such
a manner that a portion of the platform thereof extended into the aisle
"where customers walked and passed, thereby obstructing the passageway";
that as she started to leave the store she could not and did not see the scales
because of the crowded condition of the aisles, and as she was walking along
the aisle she caught her foot under the said platform and fell, thereby sus-
taining the injuries for which she seeks to recover damages. Appellee's
demurrer was overruled and verdict was rendered for appellant for $2000.
Upon appellee's request, the court submitted sixteen interrogatories to thejury, and upon appellee's motion rendered judgment for appellee upon the
answers notwithstanding the verdict. The interrogatories brought forth the
following facts:
1. Appellant on entering the store walked past the scales.
2. Appellant on entering the store could have seen the scales had she
looked along the aisle where she was walking.
3. Appellant as she was leaving the store could have seen the scales just
prior to her injury had she looked along the aisle where she was walking.
4. Appellant was not carrying her baby in such a position as to prevent
her from seeing the aisle where she was walking.
5. Appellant, prior to December 23, 1930, had frequently been along the
aisle in question.
6. There was no one between appellant and the scales as she was walking
along the aisle prior to the accident.
7. There was no evidence that appellant looked along the aisle where she
was walking prior to the accident.
Appellant appealed, assigning the rendition of judgment on the answers
to the interrogatories as error. Held, the failure to observe the condition of
an aisle in a store does not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of
law on the part of a customer who falls over an obstruction negligently placed
in said aisle.'
Two important phases of the law of negligence form the basis of the
above decision; namely, negligence as a matter of law, as distinguished from
negligence as a question for the jury, and contributory negligence on the
part of customers in stores. The fundamental factor in each is, of course,
negligence. The former involves only the problem of determining whether
12 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), sec. 903.
13 Weidlich, Rationale of Restraint Upon Remarriage After Divorce (1933), 19
Am. Bar Assoc. J. 529.
1 Thompson v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1934), 192 N. E. 893 (Ind.).
